

ETHICS OF POLITICAL LIFE

- *From the Christian-Philosophical Point of View*

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Abstract :

Sejak tata hidup bersama tampil dalam apa yang disebut *polis*, pergumulan politik merupakan pergumulan seputar bagaimana hidup bersama diorganisasi. Filsafat politik adalah filsafat yang mempromosikan nilai-nilai etis dalam penataan hidup bersama. Semangat peradaban Yunani awali memposisikan problem politis identik dengan problem etis. Hukum, keadilan, hak, kesetaraan, dan seterusnya adalah problem politis sekaligus etis. Artikel ini menggagas relasi antara politik dan etika dalam cakrawala pandang filsafat kristiani. Dengan filsafat kristiani dimaksudkan terutama ajaran para Paus yang dihimpun dalam dokumen-dokumen *Social Teaching of the Church* (Ajaran Sosial Gereja). Filsafat kristiani tidak membela nilai-nilai iman kristiani secara eksklusif melainkan nilai-nilai kebenaran etis universal manusiawi. Artikel merupakan elaborasi filosofis tema-tema pergumulan filsafat politik dan tanggapan Gereja.

Keywords : politics, ethics, nature, natural law, right, obligation, power.

The meaning of politics and its meaningful character is as evident today as it always has been since the time when political philosophy came to light in Athens. All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about something better. All political action is then guided by some thought of better and worse.¹ All political action has then in itself directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or of the good society. For the good society is the complete political good.

1. Tracing the relationship between political action and morality

The classical theorists (especially Plato and Aristotle) strive to articulate what is called the "natural character" of man. "Natural" is here understood in contradistinction to what is merely human, all too human. A human being is said to be natural if he is guided by nature rather than by convention, or by inherited opinion, or by

1 Leo Strauss, *What is political philosophy*, Chicago & London 1988, 10.

tradition. In the classical thought, the political action links closely with political virtue. In **Plato** the political action begins from the individual itself. A man is just if each of his parts does its work well and thus the whole is healthy (*Republic*, 444 d,e). The soul is in good order if each of its three parts (reason, spiritness, desire) has acquired its specific virtue, and as a consequence of this the individual is well ordered toward his fellow men and especially his fellow citizens.² For **Aristotle** the state exists for the good life. Its goal or end (*telos*) is the well-being of its citizens. It is very easy to infer from this that the government should legislate for the good life, and that all citizens should have their well-being underwritten by state action. The ideal citizen for Aristotle is the virtuous citizen. The moral consideration of the political action in Aristotle is teleological -- that is, it has a *telos*, the virtue.

Kant's central political conviction is that morality and politics must be related, since true politics cannot take a single step without first paying homage to morals. Morality and public legal justice must be related in such a way that morality shapes politics -- by forbidding war, by insisting on "eternal peace" and the rights of man -- without becoming the motive of politics (since according to Kant politics cannot hope for good will). **Descartes** does not think of any political action. Yet he breaks the old way of thought by his modern revolutionary *cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am). By the word *cogito* (I think), I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing and imagining but also feeling are here the same thing as thought. It is the first and most certain existential judgment.³ From this modernism of Descartes (who is said to be the first modern philosopher) the new era of the modern political thoughts begins with their first maestros, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Lock and Rousseau.

Machiavelli (is said to be the founder of the modern political thought) tries to effect a break with the whole tradition of political philosophy. He compares his achievement to that of men like Columbus. He claims to have discovered a new moral continent (of political action). The classical or traditional approach was based on the assumption that morality is something substantial: that is a force in the soul of man. He says that it was ineffective especially in the affairs of states and kingdoms. Against this classical assumption Machiavelli argues: virtue can be practiced only within society; ordinary men must be habituated to virtue by laws, customs and so forth. While the original educators, the founders of society, *the prince* cannot have been educated to virtue. He says that the founder of Rome was a fratricide. Man is not by nature directed toward virtue. And just as man is not by nature directed toward virtue, he is not by nature directed toward society. By nature man is radically selfish. One cannot define the good of society or the common good in terms of virtue. For Machiavelli, virtue is nothing but civic virtue, patriotism or devotion to collective selfishness.⁴ In him the political action should be done without moral judgments.

2 David Miller e.a (eds.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, Oxford 1993, 374.

3 Frederick Copleston, S.J., *A History of Philosophy Vol. IV*, New York 1985, 91.

4 Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy*, 42.

Hobbes takes a magnificent correction to Machiavelli. According to Professor Leo Strauss, Hobbes's correction of Machiavelli consists in a masterpiece of prestidigitation. Machiavelli wrote a book called *On The Prince*; Hobbes wrote a book called *On The Citizen*; i.e. Hobbes chose as his theme, not the practices of kingdoms and states, but rather the duties of subjects. He demands that natural right be derived from the state of nature: the elementary or primary wants or urges. These primary urges are of course selfish, that is, the desire for self-preservation. Or, in other word, it can be expressed negatively, the fear of violent death.⁵ This means that not the glitter and glamour of glory (Machiavelli) or virtue (classical theorists) but the terror of fear of death stands at the cradle of civil society. A strong government therefore should be established in order to avoid the fear of violent death. The fear of violent death then turns into fear of government. Such a government should be a *Leviathan*, which is the "artificial man" with an absolute sovereignty to be feared of. In the consideration of Leo Strauss, whereas the pivot of Machiavelli's political teaching was glory that of Hobbes's is power. Power is infinitely more business like than glory. Power is the objective necessity. Power is morally neutral. In other word, we can say that in Hobbes, political action becomes the "top" of all moral judgments.

After Hobbes, **John Locke** emerges brilliantly. Locke took over the fundamental scheme of Hobbes and changed it only in one point. He realized that what man primarily needs for his self-preservation is less a gun than food, or more generally, property. Thus the desire for self-preservation turns into the desire for property, for acquisition, and the right to self-preservation becomes the right to unlimited acquisition. The starting-point of Locke's political philosophy is that by nature human beings are equal and therefore nothing can put anyone under the authority of anybody else except his own consent. He makes use of the idea of a State of Nature - that is, the idea of men living together, without a common superior on earth, subject only to the dictates of natural law, until such time as they move voluntarily into political society. Natural law, according to Locke, constitutes and protects rights of life, liberty, and property; it requires men to keep their promises and to do what they can to secure the well-being of others; and it empowers them to punish transgressions.⁶ In Locke the political action links more closely with the natural law. The concept of natural law becomes something like a basis for political action.

Rousseau revises his predecessors' opinion with the concept of general will. In Hobbes's and Locke's schemes, the fundamental right of man has retained its original status within civil society: natural law remains the standard for positive law; there remains the possibility of appealing from positive law to natural law. The appeal of Hobbes and Locke -- according to Rousseau - is ineffective. Rousseau argues that civil society must be so constructed as to make the appeal from positive

5 Cf. E. Armada Riyanto, *Right and Obligation in Thomas Hobbes*, Rome: The Gregorian University 1999, Chapter III.

6 David Miller e.a. (eds.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, 293.

law to natural law utterly superfluous. Rousseau expresses this thought as follows: the general will, the will of a society, in which everyone subject to the law must have had a say in the making of the law, cannot err. The general will, the will immanent in societies of a certain kind, replaces the transcendent natural right. Rousseau's political principles then are based on the concept of the general will. Rousseau therefore traces the foundations of the law and political society itself to the general will -- that is, the citizen body acting as a whole and freely adopting rules that will apply equally to each individual. According to Leo Strauss there are difficulties in Rousseau's doctrine of general will. For, such a concept lets one say that Rousseau's doctrine of the general will is a juridical, not a moral doctrine, and that the law is necessarily more lax than morality. One might illustrate this distinction by referring to Kant who declares in his moral teaching that every lie, the saying of any untruth, is immoral, whereas Rousseau declares in his juridical teaching that the right of freedom of speech is as much the right to lie as the right to say the truth.⁷

2. Ethics of Political Life in the Catholic Teachings

Though the Church does not have (and indeed should not identified with) any political doctrine, system, and ideology, she must not keep silent in the midst of political problems of the world. She ought to be free to teach her whole doctrine (including her social doctrine) and pass moral judgment on political issues as required.⁸

"It is clear that the political community and the authority of the state are based on human nature and so belong to God's order, though the method of government and the appointment of rulers is left to the citizens' free choice. It follows that the political authority, either within the political community as such or through organization representing the state, must be exercised within the limits of the moral order and directed towards the common good [...] When citizens are under the oppression of a public authority which oversteps its competence, they should still not refuse to give or do what is objectively demanded of them by the common good; but it is legitimate for them to defend their rights [...] within the limits of the natural law and the law of the Gospel."⁹

From this excerpt we can say **some fundamental elements of the true political ethics** which must be considered in order to legitimate the authority: persons with their rights and dignity (the basis of human nature) which should be respected, order (it belongs to God's order), intentionality (towards the common good),

7 Leo Strauss, *What Is Political Philosophy*, 52.

8 Cfr. Rodger Charles S.I. and Drostan McLaren O.P., *The Social Teaching of Vatican II*, Oxford 1992, 173 - 206.

9 *Gaudium et Spes*, 74.

liberty (free choice), and moral obligation (not refuse to give or do what is objectively demanded of them by the common good [...] within the limits of the natural law and the law of the Gospel). The Christian points of the ethics of political life have been formulated not only as a counter-responses to the philosophical theories (the first), but sprung also -- especially -- from the ongoing rational endeavor of actualization of the natural law, that is, the "law" which is given and engraved by God in the heart of human being (the second). A couple of these points will be asserted as the following.

2.1. Not only a counter-responses to the philosophical theories

The Second Vatican Council's view of the fundamental reason why we establish political societies is quite clear. It is a positive view. We set up political communities because we want to find a fuller life through them. Individuals, families and the various groups that make up the civil community are aware of their inability to achieve a truly human life by their own unaided efforts; they see the need for a wider community where each one will make a specific contribution to an even broader implementation of the common good. Such a concept is frontally against Hobbes's argument which says that before entering into political society individuals were brutish and unsocial in their primitive state of nature. The strong and absolute government is needed by social compact. A social compact is entered into wherein the individual surrenders his rights and the actual power of governing himself to a ruler or to the community, and receives in return the security, which the newly created state is able to insure through the use of coercive power. Hobbes's compact leaves no political right or independence in the individual. The surrender to the Leviathan State is complete. Rousseau holds that authority resides in the sovereign will of the people. The inalienable supremacy of this "general will" of the people leads to many of the evils of modern Liberalism. Locke leads to the protection of life and property too much. This leaves a maximum of freedom in the individual -- often exercised to the point of license at the expense of the common good. The culture of individualism is the very result of such a concept. The social contract theories of the State and civil authority have many errors in common. They are one in their denial of the social nature of man and the natural origin of the State. Law and authority rest on force rather than on reason. Rights and liberties rest precariously on the basis of a grant from the sovereign State or on popular will. The conflict between security and freedom is irreconcilable because the key to its solution -- the dignity and dignity of man -- is lost.

More recently the anti-contractual school of thought has had its day -- and an evil day it was for the world. For **Hegel** (*Philosophy of Right*) the State is the divine idea as it exists on earth, and in it alone freedom obtains objectivity. The state is all and "exists for its own sake." As for the individual: "all the worth that the individual possesses, all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State." **Karl**

Marx, exponents of a materialistic and class view of society, regarded the State as nothing but an instrument of exploitation in the hands of an economically dominant class. According to **Lenin**, the "successor" of Marx, after the dictatorship of the proletariat seizes the State and through its instrumentality brings about the liquidation of the economically dominant class and the advent of the classless society, the State will have no further function and will "wither away." Like communism and socialism, German's Nazism (Hitler) and Fascism (Mussolini) are based upon theories of the State anathema to the natural law teaching. These doctrines on the origin and nature of the State, civil authority and the relationship between individuals society and the State, stand condemned by the teachings of the social doctrines of the Church.

2.2. But also the ongoing actualization of the natural law

The natural law is central to Catholic moral and social teachings. It is the kind of "reasoning" which "faith" informs. Perhaps the single most characteristic feature of traditional Catholic social teaching is that the Church can teach a morality and social problem which is applicable always, everywhere, and for everyone because it relies on the natural law as the basis for its teaching. The sense of natural law is neither "natural" nor is it "law." It is not "natural" in the sense that the natural *moral* law cannot be identified with physical, chemical, or biological laws of nature which try to express the way the natural world works. It is not "law" in the sense that is not a written code of precepts that carry public sanctions from the legislator.¹⁰ **The meaning of the natural law** is a law that determines what is right and wrong and that has power or is valid by nature, inherently, hence everywhere and always. Natural law is a "higher law". The advantage of using natural law is that the Church shows great respect for human goodness and trusts the human capacity to know and choose what is right. Also, by means of appealing to natural law, the Church can address its discussion and claims for the rightness or wrongness of particular action to all persons of good will, not just to those who share its religious convictions.

On the political society. The Catholic teaching is that the state is a natural and necessary institution of mediate divine origin. It is a natural institution because it arises out of, and is necessitated by, the very nature of man. Individual endeavor and domestic society -- the family -- are incapable of providing all the means for a full development and right ordering of men in society. Here is the necessity of the state. Man's natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties. Hence, it is divinely ordained that he should lead his life -- be it family, social or civil -- with his fellow men among whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied.¹¹ But God has likewise des-

10 Richard M. Gula, S.S., *Reason Informed By Faith*, New York 1989, 220.

11 Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei* (the encyclical on the Christian Constitution of States, issued November 1, 1885), as quoted in Francis J. Powers, C.S.V. (ed.), *Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order*, 21.

tinued man for civil society according to the dictates of his very nature. In the Creator's plan, society is a natural means which man can and must use to reach his destined end. Society is for man and not vice versa. This is not to be understood in the sense of liberalistic individualism, which subordinates society to the selfish purpose of the individual, but only in the sense that by means of an organic union with society and by mutual collaboration the attaining of earthly felicity is placed within the reach of all. Furthermore, it is a society, which affords the opportunity for the development of the entire individual and social gift bestowed on human nature. These natural endowments have a value surpassing the immediate interests of the moment, for they reflect in society the divine perfection, which would not be the case if man were to live alone.¹²

On the civil authority. Authority, too, is an attribute of man's social nature. It is not the result of a contract or compact, of convention or of force; it is not even the result of sin. Man in society needs naturally authority and could not live an ordered life without it. Force or coercion is an incident of authority, but authority is much more than force. Its real sanction is reason and its chief function is directive. Authority is an indispensable element in political society since political society is a union of citizens who co-operate with their acts for the common good. Where there is a multitude, co-ordination and harmonious operation for the common good can only be arrived at if there be present a directive principle, without which there would be confusion and anarchy. This subordination is the universal law of nature. The welfare of man are subordinated to the control of his higher faculties of will and intellect.¹³

The efficient cause of authority in itself comes from God through natural law. Thus authority is derived from the same source from which comes society. God by willing mankind with all that is required by human nature also wills society. If God wills society for the maintenance and the perfection of mankind, He must likewise will political authority without which society could not be maintained much less reach its final end. If society is willed by God, certainly authority is also willed by God in the sense that it is from the same law of nature of which God is the author. The efficient cause of authority, that which brings it into existence, therefore is the will of God who created man and gave being to what man needed according to his nature; authority comes from God through natural law as do the other natural rights -- rights which are but the rational formulation of a natural inclination.¹⁴ Man therefore has a natural right to society and society is thus constituted in accordance with human nature and with natural rights.

On the political obligation. As men are by the will of God born for civil union and society, and as the power to rule is so necessary a bond of society that, if

12 Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris* (the encyclical on Atheistic Communism issued March 19, 1937), Ibid., 22.

13 Cfr. Wilbur F. Trewik, *The Political Theory of the Papacy as expressed in the Encyclicals of the last hundred years* (Roma: Dissertationes ad lauream in Facultate Philosophiae apud Pontificium Athenaeum Angelicum de Urbe, 1955), 8.

14 Cfr. Leo XIII, *Diuturnum* (the encyclical on Civil Government), in Francis J. Powers, C.S.V., (ed), *Op.cit.*, 23.

it were removed, society must at once disintegrate, if it were removed, society must at once disintegrate, it follows that from Him who is the Author of society has come also the authority to rule, so that whosoever rules, he is the minister of God. Wherefore, as the end and nature of human society so requires, it is tight to obey the just commands of lawful authority, as it is right to obey the just commands of lawful authority, as it is right to obey God who rules all things, and it is most untrue that the people have it in their power to cast aside their obedience whenever they so please.¹⁵ Foremost in this office comes the *natural law*, which is written and engraved in the mind of every man; and this is nothing but our reason commanding us to do right and forbidding sin. Nevertheless all prescriptions of human reason can have force of law only insofar as they are the voice and interpreters of some higher power on which our reason and liberty necessarily depend, for since the force of law consists in the imposing of obligations and the granting of rights, authority is the one and only foundation of all law -- the power, that is, of fixing duties and defining rights, as also of assigning the necessary sanctions of reward and chastisement to each and all of its commands. But all this, clearly, cannot be found in man, if, as his own supreme legislator, he is to be the rule of his own actions. It follows, therefore, that the law of nature is the same thing as the *eternal law*, implanted in rational creatures, and inclining them to *their right action and end*; and can be nothing else but the eternal reason of God, the Creator and Ruler of all the world.¹⁶

On liberty. In Leo XIII we know that true liberty is based on eternal law of God. Leo did not say anything yet about democracy as the ideal government that can guarantee liberty. "It is manifested that the eternal law of God is the sole standard and rule of human liberty, not only in each individual man but also in the community and civil society which men constitute when united. Therefore, the true liberty of human society does not consist in every man doing what he pleases [...], but rather in this, that through the injunction of the civil law all may more easily conform to the prescriptions of the eternal law. Likewise, the liberty of those who are in authority does not consist in the power to lay unreasonable and capricious commands upon their subjects [...], but the binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as applications of the eternal law, and incapable of sanctioning anything which is not contained in the eternal law, as in the principle of all law. St. Augustine most wisely says: "I think that you can see, at the same time, that there is nothing just and lawful in that temporal law, unless what men have gathered from this eternal law."¹⁷

On the nature of freedom and equality in a true democracy. Pius XII did not only mention clearly democracy as the ideal government, but also asserted the liberty or freedom and equality are possible only in the true democracy. "In a people worthy of the name, those inequalities which are not based on caprice but on

15 Leo III, *Humanum Genus* (the encyclical on Freemasonry issued April 20, 1884), *Ibid.*, 28.

16 Leo XIII, *Libertas Praestantissimum*, (the encyclical on Human Liberty) *Ibid.*, 53.

17 Leo XIII, *Libertas Praestantissimum* (the encyclical on Human Liberty), *Ibid.*, 156.

the nature of things -- inequalities of culture, possessions, social standing -- so long as they are not prejudicial to justice and mutual charity, do not constitute an obstacle to the existence and the prevalence of a true spirit of union and brotherhood. On the contrary, so far are they from impairing civil equality in any way, that they make evident its true meaning, namely, that in the eyes of the State everyone has the right to live his own personal life honorably in the place and under the conditions in which the designs of Providence place him. In contrast with this portrayal of the democratic ideal of liberty and equality in a people's government conducted by honest and far-seeing men, what a spectacle is that of a democratic state left to the whims of the masses! Liberty, which is really a moral duty of the individual, becomes a tyrannous claim of freedom to give free rein to one's impulses and appetites at whatever cost or detriment to others. Equality degenerates to a mechanical level and becomes a colorless uniformity in which the sense of true honor, of personal activity, of respect for tradition, of dignity -- in a word, of all that gives life its worth -- gradually fades away and disappears."¹⁸

Equality and Liberty in a recent study. According to **Giovanni Sartori** who offers a well-done study of *the theory of democracy revisited*,¹⁹ liberty can be brought under four classes or types: (a) juridico-political equality; (b) social equality; (c) equality of opportunity as equal access, i.e. equal recognition to equal merit and equality of opportunity as equal start (or equal starting points), i.e., as equal initial material conditions for equal access to opportunities; (d) economic equality, that is, either the same wealth to each and all, or state ownership of all wealth. In accordance with the criteria of justice that inspire these equalities, and with the powers that correspond to them, those four types can be interpreted as follows: (a) to everyone the same legal and political rights, that is, the legalized power to resist political power; (b) to everyone the same social importance, that is, the power to resist social discrimination; (c) to everyone the same opportunities to rise, that is, the power to put one's own merits to account; and to everyone an adequate initial power (material conditions) to acquire the same ability and rank as everyone else; (d) to no one any economic power.

On the criteria of equality. Sartori asserts there are a couple of criteria of equality: (1) the same to all, i.e. equal shares (benefits or burdens) to all; (2) the same to equals, i.e. equal shares (benefits or burdens) to equals and therefore unequal shares to unequals, and for this there are four prominent subcriteria: (a) proportionate equality, i.e. shares monotonically allocated in proportion to the degree of extant inequality; (b) unequal shares to relevant differences; (c) to each according to his merit (desert or ability); (d) to each according to his need (basic or otherwise). The first criterion -- equal shares to all -- is eminently the principle of the legal systems that provide equal laws and equality under the law. What are the limits of the first criterion? Sartori explains that in order to be what it is, a law not only imposes

18 Pius XII, *Christmas Message 1944*, in *Ibid.*, 52.

19 Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, New Jersey 1987, 344-361.

hardships but eventually unjust hardships (because general rules cannot do justice to individual cases). Laws are not, cannot be, person-regarding, i.e. sensitive to persons and their differences. On the other hand, the counterpart of this insensitivity is that the criterion cannot be, so to speak, gerrymandered. When we say to each the same, there is no way of manipulating or twisting such a principle. The second criterion -- according to Sartory -- is no less cogent, or less defensible, than the first. The second also turns out to have a far more extensive application than the first. Its advantage consists of its flexibility, which allows not only that justice be done to subgroups but also, as we shall see, that equal results be attained.

One might say that **equality presupposes freedom**. But it does not declare a value priority or that one is more important than the other. It is simply pointing out to a procedural linkage, namely, that liberty must materialize, in time and in fact, before equality. Liberty come first, then, on the simple consideration that equality without freedom cannot even be demanded. There is, to be sure, an equality that precedes freedom and bears no relation to it; but it is the equality that exists among slaves, among individuals who are equal either in having nothing or in counting for nothing, or both, equal in being totally subjected. In one sense, equality conveys the idea of sameness. In other sense, equality goes to connote justice. Two or more persons or objects can be declared equal in the sense of being -- in some or all respects -- identical, of being the same, alike. But justice too calls on the idea of equality. Aristotle says: "Injustice is inequality, justice is equality."

3. Brief Conclusion

From the tracing of the philosophical ideas on the political action, we know that the questions were explored exhaustively consisted in the problems of regime, power, origin of the civil society with its political power, and their moral consequences. We have seen that elements of the social tradition of the Church sprung from the natural law were consolidated against the background of classical pagan philosophy and practical political developments over many centuries. St. Thomas (of whom -- we can say -- the social, philosophical, and theological teaching of the Church flows) presents us with the essential elements -- that political society grows **out of human nature according to God's design**, that the people have the right to choose their rulers and form of government, monarchy, aristocracy or democracy as they wish, though the best seems to be a form which incorporates elements of all three. Whatever the form of government, it must be for the common good in accordance with the divine eternal, divine revealed and natural laws -- which have their authoritative interpreter in the Church. Rulers who seriously neglect their duty of caring for the common good can be challenged and, in extreme circumstances, deposed.

Yet, the today question of political life in the world is changing and growing more complexly than just problem of the origin of political authority. From Sartori's

study we know that the urgent problem remains in equality and justice. The recent socio-political problem jumps from "what the power is" to "how the power can be effective." In other word, the very problem is how to concretize justice and equality into practice. The story of the developing thought of the social teaching of the Church shows that after Medellin (the second meeting of the General Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellin in 1968) the word "liberation" was used increasingly in Episcopal documents. And it angues for a freedom, a liberty denied in the present state of affairs. The crucial question arises whether it is good or not to use violence in order to gain liberty and justice.²⁰ From these new phenomena, it is evident that social and philosophical studies of the Church should grow unceasingly.

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20 Cfr. Rodger Charles S.I. & Drostan Maclaren O.P, *Op.cit.*, 246 - 247.

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